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Abstract 
This paper aims to reveal the mechanism of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and how CDOs extend 
the current global financial crisis. We first introduce the concept of CDOs and give a brief account of the de-
velopment of CDOs. We then explicate the mechanism of CDOs within a concrete example with mortgage 
deals and we outline the evolution of the current financial crisis. Based on our overview of pricing CDOs in 
various existing random models, we propose an idea of modeling the random phenomenon with the feature 
of heavy tail dependence for possible implements towards a new random modeling for CDOs. 
Keywords: Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), Cashflow CDO, Synthetic CDO, Mechanism, Financial 
Crisis, Pricing Models, Lévy Stable Distributions 
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) were created in 
1987 by bankers at Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. Within 
10 years, the CDOs had become a major force in the 
credit derivatives market, in which the value of a deriva-
tive is “derived” from the value of other assets. But 
unlike some fairly straightforward derivatives such as 
options, calls, and Credit Default Swaps (CDSs), CDOs 
are not “real”, which means they are constructs, and 
sometime even built upon other constructs. CDOs are 
designed to satisfy different type of investors, low risk 
with low return and high risk with high return. 
In early 2007, following the burst of the bubble of 
housing market in the United States, losses in the CDOs 
market started spreading. By early 2008, the CDO crisis 
had morphed into what we now encountered the world-
wide financial crisis. CDOs are at the heart of the crisis 
and even extend the crisis. 
1. Introduction to CDOs 
Collateralized Obligations (COs) are promissory notes 
backed by collaterals or securities. In the market for COs, 
the securities can be taken from a very wide spectrum of 
alternative financial instruments, such as bonds (Col- 
lateralized Bond Obligations, or CBO), loans (Co- 
llateralized Loan Obligations, or CLO), funds (Coll- 
ateralized Fund Obligations, or CFO), mortgages 
(Collateralized Mortgage Obligations, or CMO) and oth- 
ers. And frequently, they source their collaterals from a 
combination of two or more of these asset classes. 
Collectively, these instruments are popular referred to as 
CDOs, which are bond-like instruments whose cashflow 
structures allocate interest income and principal repay- 
ments from a collateral pool of different debt instruments 
to a prioritized collection of CDO securities to their 
investors. The most popular life of a CDO is five years. 
However, 7-year, 10-year, and to a less extent 3-year 
CDOs now trade fairly actively. 
A CDO can be initiated by one or more of the 
followings: banks, non-bank financial institutions, and 
asset management companies, which are referred to as 
the sponsors. The sponsors of a CDO create a company 
so-called the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The SPV 
works as an independent entity and is usually bankruptcy 
remote. The sponsors can earn serving fees, adminis- 
tration fees and hedging fees from the SPV, but otherwise 
has no claim on the cash flow of the assets in the SPV. 
According to how the SPV gains credit risks, CDOs 
are classified into two kinds: cashflow CDOs and syn- 
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thetic CDOs. If the SPV of a CDO owns the underlying 
debt obligations (portfolio), that is, the SPV obtains the 
credit risk exposure by purchasing debt obligations (eg. 
bonds, residential and commercial loans), the CDO is 
referred to as a cashflow CDO, which is the basic form 
in the CDOs market in their formative years. In contrast, 
if the SPV of a CDO does not own the debt obligations, 
instead obtaining the credit risk exposure by selling 
CDSs on the debt obligations of reference entities, the 
CDO is referred to as a synthetic CDO; the synthetic 
structure allows bank originators in the CDOs market to 
ensure that client relationships are not jeopardized, and 
avoids the tax-related disadvantages existing in cashflow 
CDOs. The following graph (Figure 1) illustrates a 
construction of a cashflow CDO. 
After acquiring credit risks, SPV sells these credit ris- 
ks in tranches to investors who, in return for an agreed 
payment (usually a periodic fee), will bear the losses in 
the portfolio derived from the default of the instruments 
in the portfolio. Therefore, the tranches holders have the 
ultimate credit risk exposure to the underlying reference 
portfolio. 
Tranching, a common characteristic of all securisa- 
tions, is the structuring of the product into a number of 
different classes of notes ranked by the seniority of in- 
vestor's claims on the instruments assets and cashflows. 
The tranches have different seniorities: senior tranche,  
the least risky tranche in CDOs with lowest fixed interest 
rate, followed by mezzanine tranche, junior mezzanine 
tranche, and finally the first loss piece or equity tranche. 
A CDO makes payments on a sequential basis, depen- 
ding on the seniority of tranches within the capital struc- 
ture of the CDO. The more senior the tranches investors 
are in, the less risky the investment and hence the less 
they will be paid in interest. The way it works is fre- 
quently referred to as a “waterfall” or cascade of cash- 
flows. We well give a specific illustration in Section 3. 
In perfect capital markets, CDOs would serve no pur- 
pose; the costs of constructing and marketing a CDO 
would inhibit its creation. In practice, however, CDOs 
address some important market imperfections. First, ban- 
ks and certain other financial institutions have regulatory 
capital requirements that make it valuable for them to 
securitize and sell some portion of their assets, reducing 
the amount of (expensive) regulatory capital that they 
must hold. Second, individual bonds or loans may be 
illiquid, leading to a reduction in their market values. 
Securitization may improve liquidity, and thereby raise 
the total valuation to the issuer of the CDO structure. 
In light of these market imperfections, at least two 
classes of CDOs are popular: the balance-sheet CDO and 
the arbitrage CDO. The balance-sheet CDO, typically in 
the form of a CLO, is designed to remove loans from the
 
Figure 1.Cashflow colateralised mortgage obligation. 
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balance sheets of banks, achieving capital relief, and 
perhaps also increasing the valuation of the assets thr- 
ough an increase in liquidity. An arbitrage CDO, often 
underwritten by an investment bank, is designed to cap- 
ture some fraction of the likely difference between the 
total cost of acquiring collateral assets in the secondary 
market and the value received from management fees 
and the sale of the associated CDOs structure. 
2. The Development of CDOs 
Although a market for CMOs—the forerunner of modern 
CDOs—was taking shape in the US market by the early 
1980s, the market for CDOs is generally believed to date 
back to the late 1980s and the rapid revolution of CDOs 
is very much a story of the 1990s. 
By the late 1990s, the structure of the international 
market for CDOs of all kinds was becoming characte- 
rized by a number of conspicuous and interrelated trends. 
Firstly, issuance volume was rising exponentially, as was 
understanding and acceptance of the CDO technique. Se- 
condly, the cross-border investment flowing into CDOs 
were rising steeply. Thirdly, more and more asset classes 
were being used as security for COs. Finally, in 1999 and 
2000 the concept of the COs was popularised across 
continental Europe with strikingly high speed and, mean- 
while, changes to legislation and regulation were emer- 
ging as important sources of support for new issuance in 
the CDOs market in Europe. 
In 2000 CDOs were made legal and at the same time 
were prevented from being regulated, by the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act, which specifies that products 
offered by banking institutions could not be regulated as 
futures contracts. It lies at the root of America's failure to 
regulate the debt derivatives that are now threatening the 
global economy. By 2000 and 2001 globally, the most 
important determinant of increasing volumes in the CDO 
market was the explosive growth in the market for credit 
derivatives in general and for CDS in particular, which 
paved the way for an equally explosive expansion of the 
market for synthetic CDOs. Thereafter, the volume of 
traditional cashflow CDOs has been eclipsed by syn- 
thetic products. 
The process of increasing diversification in the CDO 
market has began in 2002. An example of such diver- 
sification is the so-called CDOs of CDOs (CDOs squar- 
ed): a portfolio of CDOs is assembled, tranched, and sold 
to investors. Other exotic CDO products include CDOs 
of funds (CFO), and CDOs of equity default swaps 
(CDOs of EDS), forward starting CDOs, options on 
CDO tranches, leverage super senior CDOs, and bespoke 
CDOs. 
CDOs were originally static portfolios where the un- 
derlying names rarely changed and the static CDOs po- 
ssess the advantage that they call for minimal resources 
in terms of management expertise and time and reduce 
costs involved in trading. However, when they declined 
in value, investors were unable to do anything to reverse 
that decline as credit quality began to deteriorate. There- 
fore, actively managed CDOs were rapidly gaining in 
popularity. The growth of managed products, however, 
was also helped by the growing maturity of the CDO 
market and by the increasing number of managers with 
proven experience in managing credit in general and 
credit derivatives in particular. 
3. The Mechanism of CDOs 
In this section, we try to describe the mechanism of 
CDOs in a vivid, therefore not so rigorous, way. We 
simplify the collaterals as mortgages. Then the process to 
create a CDO can be seen in the following manner: 
investment banks buy mortgages and then pool them into 
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBSs) with different ra- 
tings. Financial institutions seeking new markets pur- 
chase these MBSs, pool them with other similarly rated 
MBSs and sometimes derivatives, and then issue new 
securities. This process of buying mortgages, creating 
MBSs, and packaging these MBSs into CDOs is desi- 
gned to apportion credit risk to those parties who are 
willing to take it on. 
First of all, we have a CDO manager who decides to 
create a CDO. He/She has a bottle (SPV). In order to fill 
the bottle, he/she can buy collaterals (anything he/she 
wants: the loans, credit card debt and student loans). For 
example, let us assume the collaterals are $1b mortgages 
paying interest rate of 10%. Then $1m credit-linked no- 
tes (CLNs) with par value $1k are issued based on the 
underlying collaterals portfolio. 
Secondly, we may regard its capital structure as a 
4-layer pyramid of wine glasses over a tray. Each layer 
(tranche) has different seniority. Into these glasses are the 
CLNs rated according to their riskiness. On the top layer 
is the senior tranche with 400k AAA-rated CLNs, the 
least risky tranche with lowest fixed interest rate 6%, 
followed by mezzanine tranche with 200k AA-rated 
CLNs paying fixed interest rate 7%, junior mezzanine 
tranche with 200k BBB-rated CLNs paying fixed interest 
rate 10%, and equity tranche with 200k CLNs with 
highest risk. Investors will get paid, at each payment day, 
at corresponding interest rates of tranches they are in- 
volved in. 
At the payment day, because these mortgages are pay- 
ing interest, the cork of the bottle pops off with much 
pressure. The money then flows out on the top and into 
the pyramid of the glasses. If all of the mortgages are 
paying interest, i.e., there is no default, the interest would 
sum up to $100m. Because the senior tranche is the least 
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risky, it gets paid first ($24m). After the senior tranche 
gets filled up first, the mezzanine tranche ($14m) and 
then the junior mezzanine tranche ($20m) get filled up in 
turn. Equity tranche on the bottom is still filled up with 
payment of $42m, resulting in up to 21% return rate. (cf.  
Figure 2 below) 
However, if defaults happen among these mortgages in 
the bottle, the cashflow of interest would decrease, for 
instance, let us say only $50m interests are paid (cf. 
Figure 3 below).   
 
Figure 2. Cashflow of a CDO under no defaults. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cashflow of a CDO under 50% defaults. 
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In this situation, the senior tranche still gets paid in 
full first ($24m); mezzanine tranche get paid $14m; yet 
the junior mezzanine tranche only gets paid $12m gene- 
rating 6% return rate less then 10% as expected; nothing 
can be paid to the equity tranche holders. 
If we complicate the situation further by thinking of 
another manager who also decides to create a CDO. 
Instead of filling the bottle with mortgages, he decides to 
fill with these MBSs (the first CDO). The second 
manager then takes the glasses from the bottom layer 
(equity tranche) in the previous CDO. In the boom, it 
will be no problem whenever everyone is paying their 
mortgages in the first bottle and these glasses are ge- 
nerating payment in payment day. Both pyramids of 
glasses are full.  
However, with 50% defaults, the bottom glasses in the 
first pyramid are not filled up. At payment day of the 
second CDO, the cork pops off and generates zero. In 
this case, even nothing is filled at the top glasses of the 
second CDO, they are still rated AAA, as if they were 
safe as the original assets. In the situation that housing 
market persists weak and people default or stop paying 
mortgages, there will be less and less money come out 
from the first bottle into the pyramid of glasses, and less 
and less money these AAA highly rated securities in the 
second CDO would make. Thousands of millions of 
dollars have been invested into this kind of secondary 
CDOs.  
Similarly, a third CDO can be created, which repa- 
ckage MBSs in the first and second CDO. Then, a fourth, 
a fifth, , and so on. We can easily imagine the much more 
complicated situation if we refer to the volume of the 
CDOs market. Many investment banks are involved in 
the enormous web by the CDOs contracts. 
This is the right problem. Investors have packed a lot 
of funds with these securities which are now not paying 
anything and liable never to pay anything again. Many 
financial situations start to teeter because of being tied in 
numbers of contracts. They cannot unravel these deals. 
One failure in the web starts to drag down the rest of the 
system and suck people down in the end. Nobody knows 
how big it is, how far it is and who are actually involved. 
We only find out whenever a company began to collapse, 
suddenly, the second finds itself was dragged with it and 
then the third, the forth and so on. That's the situation we 
are exactly in today. 
4. The Current Financial Crisis 
The current unprecedented financial crisis started from 
the US subprime mortgage financial crisis, and spreaded 
and accelerated by the securitisation of subprime mort- 
gages into credit derivatives, especially into kinds of 
CDOs. As the crisis develops, the real economy has been 
been obviously seen severely affected since late 2008. 
Alongside the stock bubble of mid-1990s, the US 
housing bubble grew up and began to burst in early 2007 
as the building boom led to so much over-supply that 
house prices could no longer be supported, which evo- 
lved into the so-called US subprime mortgage financial 
crisis. 
The over expansion of credit in US housing market led 
to losses by financial institutions. Initially the companies 
affected were those directly involved in home cons- 
truction and mortgage lending such as the Northern Rock 
and Countrywide Financial. Take Northern Rock, a ma- 
jor British bank, as an example. It raises most of the 
money, which it provides for mortgages via the whole- 
sale credit market, primarily by selling the debt on in the 
form of bonds. Following the widespread losses made by 
investors in the subprime mortgage market, these banks 
and investors have become wary of buying mortgage 
debt, including Northern Rock's. The highly leveraged 
nature of its business led the bank to request security 
from the Bank of England. News of this lead to investors 
panic and a bank run in mid-September 2007. Northern 
Rock's problems proved to be an early indication of the 
severe troubles that would soon befall other banks and 
financial institutions. 
The crisis then began to affect general availability of 
credit to non-housing related businesses and to large 
financial institutions not directly connected with mor- 
tgage lending. It is the “securitisation” process, which 
spreads the current crisis. Many subprime mortgages 
were securitised and sold to investors using asset-backed 
securities (ABSs). It has been estimated that 54% of 
subprime mortgages were securitised in 2001 and this 
rose to 75% in 2006 [1]. At the heart of the portfolios of 
many financial institutions were investors whose assets 
had been derived from bundled home mortgages. 
In early 2007, when defaults were rising in the mor- 
tgage market, New York's Wall Street began to feel the 
first tremors in the CDOs world. Hedge fund managers, 
commercial and investment banks, and pension funds, all 
of which had been big buyers of CDOs, found them- 
selves landed in trouble, as many CDOs included deri- 
vatives that were built upon mortgages—including risky, 
subprime mortgages. More importantly, the mathematical 
models that were supposed to protect investors against 
risk weren’t working. The complicating matter was that 
there was no market on which to sell the CDOs. CDOs 
are not traded on exchanges and even not really stru- 
ctured to be traded at all. If one had a CDO in his/her 
portfolio, then there was not much he/she could do to 
unload it. The CDO managers were in a similar bind. As 
fear began to spread, the market for CDOs' underlying 
assets also began to disappear. Suddenly it was impo- 
ssible to dump the swaps, subprime-mortgage derivatives, 
and other securities held by the CDOs. 
Copyright © 2010 SciRes                                                                                  IIM 
H. W. DU  ET  AL. 154 
In March 2008, slightly more than a year after the first 
indicator of troubles in the CDO market, Bear Stearns, 
which was one of Wall Street's biggest and most pres- 
tigious firms and which had been engaged in the secu- 
ritisation of mortgages, fell prey and was acquired by JP 
Morgan Chase through the deliberate assistance from the 
US government. By the middle of 2008, it became clear 
that no one was safe; everyone—even those who had 
never invested in anything—would wind up paying the 
price. On September 15, 2008, the 158 year-old Lehman 
Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The 
collapse of Lehman Brothers is the largest investment 
bank failure since Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990 and 
triggered events that seemed unthinkable a year before: 
the high volatility of worldwide financial institutions, 
massive state-funded bailouts of some of the world's 
leading financial institutions and the disappearance of 
investment banks.  
The 94 year-old Merrill Lynch accepted a purchase 
offer by Bank of America for approximately US$ 50 
billion, a big drop from a year-earlier market valuation of 
about US$ 100 billion. A credit rating downgrade of the 
large insurer American International Group (AIG) led to 
a rescue agreement on September 16, 2008 with the 
Federal Reserve Bank for a $ 85 billion dollar secured 
loan facility, in exchange for a warrants for 79.9% of the 
equity of AIG. Even, in January 2009, HBOS, a banking 
and insurance group in UK, was taken over by Lloyds 
TSB Banking Group. 
The crisis is now much far beyond the virtual economy, 
the real economy has been severely affected. The global 
economy is in the midst of a deep downturn. The dra- 
matic intensification of the financial crisis has generated 
historic declines in consumer and business confidence, 
steep falls in household wealth, and severe disruptions in 
credit intermediation. 
In the last quarter of 2008, industrial production has 
fallen precipitously across both advanced and emerging 
economies, declining by some 15%–20% and merchan- 
dise exports have fallen by some 30%–40%, at an annual 
rate. Official figures show that the Britain industrial 
production dived at record speed, underlying how hard 
the global downturn has hit producers and exporters: 
manufacturing outputs dropped by 2.9% in January, 2009, 
taking annual rate of decline to 12.8%, which is the 
biggest decline since January, 1981; broader industrial 
productions, including mining and utilities, are now also 
falling at an annual rate of 11.4%, again the worst since 1981. 
Labor markets are weakening rapidly, particularly in 
those advanced economies. In February, 2009, the US 
unemployment rate rose to 8.1%, the highest in more 
than 25 years and more layoffs are on the way; the 
Britain unemployment rate rose to 6.3%, up 1.1% on 
2008, and the Euro unemployment rate rose to 8.2%, the 
highest level in over 2 years. 
Despite production cut-backs by OPEC, oil prices 
have declined by nearly 70% since their July 2008 peak. 
Similarly, metals prices are now around 50% below their 
March 2008 peaks. Food prices have eased 35% from 
their peak, reflecting not only deteriorating global cyc- 
lical conditions, but also favorable harvests. 
Clearly, the global economy faces a contraction in ov- 
erall Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the first time 
since the Second World War, as claimed by Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, the head of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). 
5. Mathematical Challenges in Modeling the 
Mechanism of CDOs 
The investment banks presented CDOs as investments in 
which, actually, the key factors were not the underlying 
assets, rather the use of mathematical calculations to 
create and distribute the cash flows. In other words, the 
basis of a CDO was not a mortgage, a bond or even a 
derivative, but the metrics and algorithms of quants and 
traders. In particular, the CDO market skyrocketed in 
2001 with the invention of a formula called the Gaussian 
Copula, which made it easier to price CDOs quickly. But 
what seemed to be the great strength of CDOs—complex 
formulas that protected against risk while generating 
high returns—turned out to be flawed. 
Normally financial institutions do not trade instru- 
ments unless they have satisfactory models for valuing 
them. What is surprising about the financial crisis is that 
financial institutions were prepared to trade senior 
tranches of an ABS (i.e., an asset-backed security) or an 
ABS CDO (an instrument in the synthetic CDOs market) 
without a model [1]. The lack of a model makes risk 
management almost impossible and causes problems 
when the instrument ceases to be rated. Because models 
were not developed, the key role of correlation in valuing 
ABSs and (particularly) ABS CDOs was not well 
understood. Many investors and analysts assumed that 
CDOs were diversified, and hence made less risky, due 
to the large number of individual bonds that might 
underlie a given deal. In fact, the investments within the 
CDOs turned out to be more highly correlated than 
expected. 
Pricing a CDO is mainly to find the appropriate spread 
for each tranche and its difficulty lies in how to estimate 
the default correlation in formulating models that fit 
market data. With the empirical evidence of the existence 
of mean reversion phenomena in efficient credit risk 
markets, mean-reverting type stochastic differential 
equations are considered (cf. e.g. [2]). In addition, the 
CDOs market has seen the phenomenon of heavy tail 
dependence in a portfolio, which draws the attention to 
use modeling with heavy tail phenomenon as a feature. 
Besides, the efficiency in calibrating pricing models to 
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market prices should be paid much attention. A well- 
calibrated and easily implemented model is the right 
goal. 
The market standard model is the so-called one factor 
Gaussian copula model. Its origins can be found in [3,4]. 
The assumptions of the one factor Gaussian copula 
model about the characteristics of the underlying 
portfolio simplify the analytical derivation of CDOs 
premiums but are not very realistic. Thereafter more and 
more extensions have been proposed to pricing CDOs: 
homogeneous infinite portfolio is extended to homogen- 
eous finite portfolio, and then to heterogeneous finite 
portfolio which represents the most real case; multi- 
factor models are considered other than one factor model; 
Gaussian copula is replaced by alternative probability 
distribution functions; the assumptions of constant defau- 
lt probability, constant default correlation and determi- 
nistic loss given default are relaxed and stochastic ones 
are proposed which incorporate dynamics into pricing 
models. 
In one line of thinking, to relax the assumption of 
Gaussian distribution in the one factor Gaussian copula 
model, student-t copula [5–12], double-t copula [13,14], 
Clayton copula [12,15–20], Archimedian copula [21,22], 
Marshall Olkin copula [23–26] are studied. And default 
correlations are made stochastic and correlated with the 
systematic factor in [27,28] to relax the assumption that 
default correlations are constant through time and 
independent of the firms default probabilities. Hull and 
White propose the implied copula method in [29]. 
In the other line of thinking, many stochastic processes 
are applied in CDOs pricing models to describe the de- 
fault dependence. Markov chains are used to represent 
the distance to default of single obligor (eg. [30,31]). Then 
correlation among obligors is introduced with nonrecom- 
bining trees [30] or via a common time change of affine 
type [31]. 
Some researchers include jumps in CDOs pricing mo- 
del. Duffie and Garleanu [32], for example, propose an 
approach based on affine processes with both a diffusion 
and a jump components. To improve tractability, Chapo- 
vsky, Rennie and Tavares [33] suggest a model in which 
default intensities are modeled as the the sum of a 
compensated common random intensity driver with trac- 
table dynamics (e.g. the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model (or 
CIR model in short) with jumps) and a deterministic 
name-depended function. 
Motivated by the possibility that price processes could 
be pure jump, several authors have focused their att- 
ention on pure jump models in the Lévy class. Firstly, we 
have the Normal Inverse Gaussian (NIG) model of 
Barndorff-Nielsen [34], and its generalisation to the 
generalised hyperbolic class by Eberlein, Keller, and 
Prause [35]. Kalemanova, Schmid and Werner [36] and 
Guégan and Houdain [37] work with NIG factor model. 
Secondly, we have the symmetric Variance Gamma (VG) 
model studied by Madan and Seneta [38] and its asy- 
mmetric extension studied by Madan and Milne [39], 
Madan, Carr, and Chang [40]. Baxter [41] introduces the 
B-VG model where has both a continuous Brownian 
motion and a discontinuous variance—Gamma jump 
terms. Finally, we have the model developed by Carr, 
Geman, Madan, and Yor (acronym: CGMY) [42], which 
further generalises the VG model. Most of these models 
are special cases of the generic one-factor Lévy model 
supposed in [43]. Lévy models bring more flexibility into 
the dependence structure and allow tail dependence. 
Besides default dependence, the recovery rate is also 
an important variable in pricing CDOs. Empirical reco- 
very rate distributions in [44] have high variance and the 
certainty with which one can predict recovery is quite 
low. One undisputed fact about recovery rates is that 
average recovery rates tend to be inversely related to 
default rates: in a bad year, not only are there many 
defaults, but recoveries are also low. The loss process 
models involve the development of a model for the 
evolution of the losses on a portfolio. Graziano and 
Rogers [45] provide semi-analytic formulas via Markov 
chain and Laplace transform techniques which are both 
fast and easy to implement. In [46], Schoenbucher deri- 
ves the loss distribution of the portfolio from the tran- 
sition rates of an auxiliary time-inhomogeneous Markov 
chain and stochastic evolution of the loss distribution is 
obtained by equipping the transition rates with stochastic 
dynamics. Other loss process can be found in [47] where 
discuss a dynamic discrete-time multi-step Markov loss 
model and in [48] where loss follows a jump process. 
6. Modeling Heavy Tail Phenomena by Lévy 
Distributions 
From the mathematical view point, we see the highly 
complexity and chaotic dynamics in the system of CDOs, 
and, especially, the phenomenon of heavy tail depend- 
ence. In literatures, researchers have investigated quite a 
lot of models in pricing CDOs, but seldom incorporate 
Lévy stable distributions to represent the heavy tail 
dependence in the modeling. In this final section, we 
shall explicate and suggest an idea about applying Lévy 
stable distributions in pricing CDOs. 
Historically, the application of probability distribu- 
tions in mathematical modeling for the real world 
problems started with the use of Gaussian distributions to 
express errors in measurement. Concurrently with this, 
mathematical statistics emerged. The mean of a Gaussian 
distribution traditionally represents the most probable 
value for the actual size and the variance of it is related 
to the errors of the measurement. The whole distribution 
is in fact a prediction which is easy to check, since it was 
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developed for probability distributions which can be well 
characterized by their first two moments. 
Other probability distributions have appeared in 
mathematical modeling where the mean and variance can 
not well represent the process. For example, it is 
well-known that all moments, of the lognormal distribu- 
tion are finite but . This fact shows that a lot of weight is 
in the tail of the distribution where rare but extreme 
events can occur. This phenomenon is the so-called 
heavy tail dependence phenomenon and is exactly the 
one observed in the market for CDOs. 
Moreover, probability distributions with infinite mo- 
ments are also encountered in the study of critical ph- 
enomena. For instance, at the critical point one finds 
clusters of all sizes while the mean of the distribution of 
clusters sizes diverges. Thus, analysis from the earlier 
intuition about moments had to be shifted to newer no- 
tions involving calculations of exponents, like e.g. Lya- 
punov, spectral, fractal etc., and topics such as strange 
kinetics and strange attractors have to be investigated. 
It was Paul Lévy who first grappled in-depth with 
probability distributions with infinite moments. Such 
distributions are now called Lévy distributions. Today, 
Lévy distributions have been expanded into diverse areas 
including turbulent diffusion, polymer transport and 
Hamiltonian chaos, just to mention a few. Although 
Lévy's ideas and algebra of random variables with 
infinite moments appeared in the 1920s and the 1930s (cf. 
[49,50]), it is only from the 1990s that the greatness of 
Lévy's theory became much more appreciated as a 
foundation for probabilistic aspects of chaotic dynamics 
with high entropy in statistical analysis in mathematical 
modelling (cf. [51,52], see also [53,54]). Indeed, in 
statistical analysis, systems with highly complexity and 
(nonlinear) chaotic dynamics became a vast area for the 
application of Lévy processes and the phenomenon of 
dynamical chaos became a real laboratory for developing 
generalizations of Lévy processes to create new tools to 
study nonlinear dynamics and kinetics. Following up this 
point, Lévy type processes and their influence on long 
time statistical asymptotic will be unavoidably encountered. 
As a flavor on this aspect, let us finally give a brief 
account for modelling the risk with Lévy processes 
within the framework of the intensity based models. 
Relative to the copula approach, intensity based mo- 
dels has the advantage that the parameters have econo- 
mic interpretations. Furthermore, the models, by nature, 
deliver stochastic credit spreads and are therefore well- 
suited for the pricing of CDOs tranches. In the intensity 
based model, default is defined as the first jump of a pure 
jump process, and it is assumed that the jump process has 
an intensity process. More formally, it is assumed that a 
non-negative process λ exists such that the process  
{ } { }
0
( ) : 1 1 ( )
t
t sM t s     
is a martingale. And the default correlation is generated 
through dependence of firms' intensities on the common 
factor. 
Following Mortensen [55], we assumes that default of 
obligor is modelled as the first jump of a Cox process 
with a default intensity composed of a common and an 
idiosyncratic component in the following way  
( ) ( ) ( )i i c it a X t X t    
where ai>0 is a constant and Xc and Xi are independent 
Lévy processes. Namely, the two independent processes 
Xc and Xi are of the following form  
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where mean values θc, θi and volatilities are constants, σc, 
σi>0 are constants, Wc(t), Wi(t) ane independent 
Brownian motions on (Ω, Ғ, P; { Ғt}t≥0); Nc(t, A), Ni(t, A) 
are defined to be the numbers of jumps of process Xc, Xi 
with size smaller than A during time period t. For fix A, 
Nc(t, A), Ni(t, A) are Poisson processes with intensity 
μc(A), μi(A) respectively. 
Based on these assumptions, we may calculate marg- 
inal default probability, joint default probability and the 
characteristic function of the integrated common risk 
factor to get the expression of expected tranche losses. 
Finally, we may get the tranche spreads of CDOs. We 
will realize this aim in our forthcoming work towards the 
concrete mathematical modelling. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we start with detailed explanation of the 
mechanism of CDOs and discuss the mathematical cha- 
llenge in modelling the complexity systems arising from 
CDOs. We link the feature of CDOs with heavy tail 
phenomenon and then propose to use Lévy process, in 
particular Lévy stable process, to model risk factors in 
pricing CDO tranche spreads. 
ds  
Our paper shows Lévy stable distribution may capture 
the feature of high default dependence among CDOs' 
underlying portfolio. 
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